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Bid Protests in Public Procurement: Czech Case
Nedvěd, Adam ; Skuhrovec, Jiří (advisor) ; Soudek, Jan (referee)
Bid protest mechanisms provide supervision over public procurement processes. If set up properly, these mechanisms improve both ex-ante and ex-post e - ciency of public procurement. However, decentralisation of the oversight can create opportunities for bidders to strategically abuse the system at the soci- ety's expense. In order to assess e ciency of the Czech bid protest mechanism, an empirical policy analysis of was conducted using a unique combined dataset of all bid protest rulings of the Czech supervising authority linked to a com- plete dataset of public contracts procured between 2007 and 2014. Econometric methods for panel data analysis were employed in order to estimate e↵ects of bid protesting on returns in form of awarded contracts. The selected approach made it possible to focus on individual relationships between contracting au- thorities and their suppliers. The results show significant di↵erences between returns of protest against EU co-funded and EU unfunded contracts. Moreover signs of strategical system abuse related to public works contracts were found.
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Political connections and ruling in public procurement disputes: Are the decisions of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition politically biased?
Viktorinová, Marie ; Palanský, Miroslav (advisor) ; Janský, Petr (referee)
Marie Viktorinová Abstract The data about financial support of firms and individuals to politicians provide an incentive for research as the connections between businesses and politics raises the problem of conflict of interest. Using data about results of disputes in public procurement tenders from 2004 to 2018, data about donations to political parties and data about parties in power of municipalities, regions and ministries between the years 2006 and 2018, this thesis investigates the effect of political connections on the results of disputes in public procurement. The analyze focuses on hypotheses about significant effect of having complainant or chosen contestant connected to party in power of government, municipality, region or ministry on the result of dispute being serious misconduct against fair competition, where distinct subsets of disputes with respective contracting authority are considered. Using logistic and probit regressions, the results of this thesis point out a significant positive relationship between misconduct found and chosen contestant connected to any party. Finally, the thesis lays down its constrictions and few suggestions for future research.
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Analysis of decision making of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition in public procurement cases
Ducháček, Tomáš ; Soudek, Jan (advisor) ; Skuhrovec, Jiří (referee)
This thesis analyzes the decision making of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition in public procurement cases. It deals with both procurement oversight and the underlying incentives of the participants of proceedings. The aim of this thesis is to show the motivation of participants of proceedings is various and it often differs from the initial purpose of the oversight. The decisions of the Office and the length of proceeding before the Office play an important role in the incentives of participants. First, the author summarizes the legislative framework of the proceeding before the Office with emphasis on economically important aspects. Then he performs the analysis of the decisions. The results show that the length of proceeding before the Office is quite long and both contracting authorities and petitioners respond to this fact. The contracting authorities tend to cancel the procurement or make a deal even during the proceeding, on the other hand some the petitioners submit frivolous proposals. In addition the fines imposed by the Office are rather on lower boundary.
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Bid Protests in Public Procurement: Czech Case
Nedvěd, Adam ; Skuhrovec, Jiří (advisor) ; Soudek, Jan (referee)
Bid protest mechanisms provide supervision over public procurement processes. If set up properly, these mechanisms improve both ex-ante and ex-post e - ciency of public procurement. However, decentralisation of the oversight can create opportunities for bidders to strategically abuse the system at the soci- ety's expense. In order to assess e ciency of the Czech bid protest mechanism, an empirical policy analysis of was conducted using a unique combined dataset of all bid protest rulings of the Czech supervising authority linked to a com- plete dataset of public contracts procured between 2007 and 2014. Econometric methods for panel data analysis were employed in order to estimate e↵ects of bid protesting on returns in form of awarded contracts. The selected approach made it possible to focus on individual relationships between contracting au- thorities and their suppliers. The results show significant di↵erences between returns of protest against EU co-funded and EU unfunded contracts. Moreover signs of strategical system abuse related to public works contracts were found.
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